The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater market power than conventional banks. Indeed Islamic banks may benefit from a captive clientele, owing to religious principles, which would be charged greater prices. JEL Codes: G21, D43, D82.
I. Introduction
There is a wide expansion of Islamic banks in the recent decades. Since the creation of the first modern Islamic bank in 1975, the number of these institutions has increased to over 300 operating in more than 75 countries. Total assets of Islamic banks worldwide are estimated at about 300 billion USD with an annual growth rate of more than 15% over the last decade (Chong and Liu, 2009 ). 2 In this area, a key question concerns the market power of Islamic banks. Market power is the ability of a firm to influence the price of products and is therefore directly linked to competition, as greater competition reduces market power. Islamic banks may have a greater market power than conventional banks. Indeed they can benefit from a clientele with a more inelastic demand, coming from religious principles. Most countries with Islamic banks have the ongoing presence of few Islamic banks with conventional banks. Therefore, religious clients may be more captive to Islamic banks following their will to respect the Shariah, than non-religious clients to all categories of banks. El Gamal (2007) mentions that some providers and observers of the Islamic banking industry refer to these additional charges and rates for clients of Islamic banks as "the cost of being Muslim", and stresses the possibility of such overpricing.
Despite this considerable development, the academic literature -though increasingremains scarce on the economic implications of Islamic banking in comparison with conventional banking. Indeed it is of utmost interest to know whether Islamic banks may differ than conventional banks for economic issues, and may therefore foster or hamper economic development in comparison to conventional banks. 3 The comparative analysis of market power between Islamic and conventional banks is a fundamental issue for economic development, as several studies have shown the importance of market power for economic development (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001 ). In a nutshell, the argument is that greater bank competition enhances access to credit at lower cost that leads to more borrowing for firms, which promotes growth. More generally, an enhancement of bank competition can favor financial development by increasing access to financial products and, as literature has shown Kuran (2004) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Methodology is reported in section 2.
Section 3 describes the data. The empirical results are shown in Section 4. We finally provide some concluding remarks in section 5.
II. Methodology
Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several tools, which can be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the new empirical where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w 1 the price of labor (the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) Once marginal cost has been estimated and price of output computed it is able to calculate the Lerner index for each bank and obtain a direct measure of bank competition.
III. Data
The sample used in this study includes the commercial, cooperative and savings banks We adopt the Tukey box-plot, based on the use of interquartile range to clean data: banks with observations out of the range defined by the first and third quartiles that are greater or less than twice the interquartile range were dropped for each input price. We also perform some truncations for the Lerner indices. All outliers were dropped. These criteria produce a sample of 1301 observations for 264 banks, with 135 observations for 34 Islamic banks and 1166 observations for 230 conventional banks. The sample is described by country and by type of banks in table 1. Table 2 displays summary statistics for the variables adopted in the estimations. A striking observation is the similarities of both types of banks. No significant difference in bank size can be observed. The mean Islamic bank has 3.27 million USD of total assets to be compared to 3.78 million USD for the mean conventional bank. We also observe very similar mean input prices for labor and physical capital. The only difference concerns the price of borrowed funds which is greater for conventional banks (4.93% vs. 3.50% for Islamic banks).
This dissimilarity can be relied to the observation of a greater equity to assets ratio for Islamic banks (14.72% vs. 10.95% for conventional banks). Indeed, as Islamic banks rely more on equity, they may have lower charges on borrowed funds. Finally, we observe a major difference for activities with the analysis of the ratio of loans to investment assets, which is by far greater for conventional banks. This is in line with the different activities practiced by Islamic banks and conventional banks. Both these latter points suggest including the ratios of equity to assets and of loans to investment assets in the estimations explaining market power, as they constitute key differences between both types of banks.
IV. Results
This section presents our results for the differences in market power between Islamic and conventional banks. We start with the Lerner indices for each type of bank. Next, we perform regressions of the Lerner index on a set of variables to take control variables into account. Finally, we perform a robustness check with an alternative measure of competition.
IV.1 The market power measures
We present the means of Lerner indices in table 3 other years. Nonetheless the main finding is that the difference in market power is not significant either for each year considered separately or for the full period.
Thus, our major conclusion is the absence of significant difference in market power between Islamic banks and conventional banks. We do not support the arguments according to which Islamic banks would have greater market power.
However this analysis has not considered the possible role of other characteristics of banks that differ between both types of banks. Furthermore, the fact that banks come from different countries should be taken into account. We therefore perform a regression of Lerner indices on a set of variables including the type of bank and several control variables.
IV.2 Regression
We perform a random effects GLS regression of the Lerner indices. This specification is motivated by the use of panel data, and the fact that the key explanatory variable, the fact that a bank is Islamic or not, is constant over time. The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is Islamic and zero else (Islam). We include three control variables in the regression: the ratio of loans to investment assets (Loans to Investment Assets) to take the mix of assets into account, the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity to Total Assets) to control for risk aversion, and size measured by the logarithm of total assets (Bank Size). We also include dummy variables for countries and years in the regression.
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. We observe a significantly positive sign for the size of the bank, which is in line with the fact that greater banks benefit from stronger market power. The ratio of loans to investment assets is not significant, meaning that the structure of assets between loans and investment assets does not exert an impact on market power. Finally, the ratio of equity to assets is significantly positive, according to which banks with greater solvency benefit from market power. This finding may be explained by the fact that better solvency allows the banks to charge greater prices to their services. Several papers have indeed shown the existence of market discipline among depositors, in particular in developing or transition countries in which the risk of bank failure is considered as important to favor is the promotion of mutual help and cooperation. As a consequence, Kuran (2004) explains that a producer or a trader is free to seek personal profit, but he must avoid harming others. Therefore, he must charge fair prices to his customers. Thus, Islamic banks have the obligation to charge fair prices, which may limit their ability to charge the maximal price permitted by their degree of market power.
A big debate however exists in the literature about the practice of these specific norms in Islamic banks. Kuran (1995) Some explanations can also be suggested which are based on the economic incentives for an Islamic bank to charge lower prices than other banks. Islamic banks may have greater incentives to avoid moral hazard behavior of borrowers, which gives them incentives to charge lower loan rates than conventional banks. The reasoning is based on the argument from Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) . They pointed out the fact that lower loan rates make easier the repayment of loans, and consequently reduced the moral hazard behavior of borrowers to shift into riskier projects, which leads to lower default risk of borrowers. As a consequence, the more the bank suffers from moral hazard behavior of borrowers, the more the bank is inclined to charge lower rates. As Islamic banks follow the profit and loss sharing paradigm in opposition to conventional banks which charge fixed repayments, Islamic banks are more affected by moral hazard behavior as their return is riskier. They consequently have more incentives to avoid moral hazard behavior and then to charge lower rates.
Furthermore, we can also point out the fact than, on the deposit side, the depositors of Islamic banks are similar to shareholders as they do not have a fixed interest rate and share profits and losses of the bank. Consequently, greater profits from depositor services also mean higher prices charged for depositors for them. Thus, they may have incentives to refrain prices of financial services for depositors.
Finally, a last argument can also be advanced which is not guided by specific features of Islamic banking. As Islamic banking is a relatively recent industry, Islamic banks may be younger than conventional banks. However literature has shown the existence of switching costs in the banking industry. These costs notably derive from the time and effort to close an account or to become comfortable with a new bank (Kim, Kliger and Vale, 2003) , or can also endogenously result from the better information of the bank on their clients than competitors (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992) . As a consequence, as their establishment is more recent on average, Islamic banks may have a clientele less captive, which prevents them to have a similar market power than other banks.
IV.3 A robustness check
To further address the validity of the results, we use an alternative measure for bank competition in our estimations. We therefore estimate the Rosse-Panzar model (Rosse and Panzar, 1977) , which has been widely applied in banking (e.g. Claessens where REVENUES total revenues, w 1 , w 2 and w 3 prices of labor, physical capital, and borrowed funds respectively which are defined below, ASSETS total assets, EQASS the ratio of equity to total assets, k country, ISLAM dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is Islamic, CONVENTIONAL dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is conventional.
The variables ASSETS and EQUITY TO ASSETS take into account differences in size and risk respectively, akin to Bikker and Haaf (2002) . Indices for each bank have been dropped in the presentation for simplicity. Therefore the H-statistic is equal to α 1 + α 2 + α 3 for Islamic banks and to α 4 + α 5 + α 6 for conventional banks. 
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we compare the market power of Islamic and conventional banks by computing Lerner indices for a large sample of banks from countries in which both types of banks coexist. Our hypothesis is that market power is greater for Islamic banks, in line with the view that these institutions benefit from clients with a more inelastic demand. This issue is of fundamental interest to understand the normative implications of the expansion of Iskamic banks. It has indeed been shown that lower bank competition may be detrimental to growth.
Our findings clearly reject this hypothesis. The comparison of Lerner indices shows not significant difference in market power between Islamic and conventional banks. Furthermore, the regression of market power indices even suggests a lower market power for Islamic banks.
We explain the lower market power of Islamic banks by their different religious and economic incentives. Indeed Islamic banks are supposed to respect some "Islamic" norms of behavior, such as the obligation to charge fair prices. This might consequently limit their ability to charge high prices. Furthermore, Islamic banks have incentives to charge lower loan rates than conventional banks, as they suffer more from the moral hazard behavior of borrowers which can be favored through high rates.
Thus, our conclusions do not provide support on some detrimental effects of the expansion of Islamic banks in terms of market power. Nevertheless the results of this study should be considered with care. Indeed this is the first contribution on this issue. Further work is therefore needed to confirm the findings and also to deepen the relevance of our interpretations. 
